According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifi es hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. Th is paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond.
i Th e epistemic relativist, like any philosopher with a view, faces two connected challenges. Th e fi rst is to provide a statement of his view that is not incoherent on its face; the second is to provide good reasons for accepting that view. Boghossian's discussion of epistemic relativism in chapter 6 focuses on the fi rst challenge. We all know roughly what the epistemic relativist means to say -or better, what one sort of relativist means to say. His view is that there are no "absolute" or "universally valid" epistemic norms or standards, and that particular claims about whether some belief is justifi ed or unjustifi ed, rational or irrational, are never simply true (or false). At best they are true (or false) relative to one or another epistemic system or framework. But what exactly does this mean? According to Boghossian, the epistemic relativist simply cannot say. Every moderately promising attempt to formulate the view collapses into incoherence or obscurity. And needless to say, if the relativist cannot meet this fi rst challenge, the second does not arise: if there is nothing for epistemic relativism to be, then a fortiori, there are no good reasons for believing that it is true.
Boghossian does not reject every form of relativism. Th at would be preposterous. Consider:
(1) Th e salt is to the left of the pepper.
G i d e o n R o s e n
The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge (2) Th e velocity of the sun is 220 km/s. (3) Bigamy is illegal.
Th ere is a sense in which these sentences are never simply true. Th ey are at best true, or false, only relative to some parameter. If you are standing on my side of the table, then (1) may be true fr om your point of view but not from the point of view of someone standing on the other side. Th e velocity of the sun is 220 km/s relative to a fr ame of reference in which the center of the galaxy is at rest. Bigamy is illegal in New Jersey but not in Saudi Arabia, etc. Th is is a familiar phenomenon. Sometimes a grammatically complete declarative sentence is incapable of truth or falsity simpliciter, but fully capable of truth or falsity relative to some parameter. 1 Concrete utterances of such sentences may be true or false full stop; but that is only because the conversational context somehow supplies a value for the parameter in question. 2 According to one sort of epistemic relativist, certain normative epistemic statements fall into this category. Th us consider statements of the form:
(4) Evidence E justifi es the belief that H For instance (5) Tycho's observations justify the belief that the earth revolves around the sun.
Th e epistemic relativist maintains that statements of this sort are only true (or false) relative to an epistemic system: a set of standards or norms for assessing opinions as justifi ed or unjustifi ed, reasonable or unreasonable, in light of the available evidence. When Galileo and Bellarmine appear to disagree about (5), it may be that, properly understood, both are right. It is possible that Galileo's utterance is true relative to his epistemic system; that Bellarmine's is true relative to his; and that the standard relevant for assessing the "rightness" or "correctness" of an epistemic claim is the standard that the speaker himself accepts or endorses.
3 Th e proponent of any such view owes us answers to three questions: (a) What is an epistemic system? (b) What is it for an epistemic claim to be true or false relative to such a system? And (c) What is it for a person to accept an epistemic system? Boghossian rejects this sort of relativism -which he clearly regards as the most promising sort -on the ground that no satisfactory package of answers to these questions is forthcoming.
ii To get a feel for the problem, let's consider the most straightforward package of answers. Suppose we say, in answer to (a) , that an epistemic system is a general claim of the form (6):
(6) For all e, h: e justifi es h iff φ(e, h), where φ does not contain the word 'justifi es' or any similar epistemic term. 4 We might then say, in answer to (b) , that a particular epistemic statement, 'E justifi es H' , is true relative to such a system just in case that system, together with the non-epistemic facts, entails 'E justifi es H' . And we might also say, in answer to (c), that to accept an epistemic system is simply to believe what it says, or to believe that it is true.
Boghossian shows conclusively that this won't do. It is a central feature of the relativist's view that normative epistemic claims are incapable of simple truth. We have focused on particular epistemic claims about the relation between particular bodies of evidence and particular hypotheses. But claims like (6) -epistemic systems -are also normative epistemic claims. So the relativist must hold that they too are incapable of simple truth. Th at is the view, aft er all: for the relativist there are no absolute or universally valid standards for assessing hypotheses in the light of evidence. If epistemic systems could be simply (i.e., absolutely) true, they would provide standards of just this sort.
But if epistemic systems cannot be true, the package is untenable. Any defensible form of relativism must be refl ectively acceptable. Th e epistemic relativist himself -the philosopher, having achieved full self-consciousness -must be in a position to accept epistemic relativism as he has formulated it. But the epistemic relativist is like everyone else in this respect: he makes particular epistemic judgments about what the evidence supports. And this means (according to the relativist) that he must accept an epistemic system C. According to the straightforward package, to accept an epistemic system is to believe that it is true. But the relativist's offi cial position is that epistemic claims in general, and C in particular, are never simply true. So on the present account the relativist is committed to a contradiction: C is true, but C is not true. And that is incoherent by (almost) anyone's lights.
Th is shows decisively that the relativist cannot identify acceptance of an epistemic system with the belief that it is simply true. So either acceptance is to be identifi ed with belief in some other proposition, or it is not a form of belief at all. Call this the acceptance problem. We will return to it in due course.
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Even if the acceptance problem can somehow be solved, a second independent problem arises. Boghossian writes:
How are we to understand the phrase 'in relation to epistemic system C'? Since we have said that the propositions that constitute a system as well as the ordinary epistemic propositions are incomplete, that relation cannot be the relation of logical entailment. 'Relative to epistemic system C' , then, must be understood as expressing some non-logical relation that obtains between a belief 's being justifi ed and some epistemic system. But what can such a non-logical relation be? (2006, 89) Th is objection -call it the entailment problem -assumes that logical relations only obtain between "complete propositions." Since epistemic propositions are not complete, they cannot stand in logical relations, and so we cannot say, as the straightforward package requires, that an epistemic claim is true relative to an epistemic system just when it is entailed by that system (together with the non-epistemic facts). Now this may seem much too quick. Aft er all, it is easy to defi ne suitable notions of logical entailment that apply to sentences that are capable of truth or falsity only relative to some parameter. Consider Th e velocity of the sun is 220 km/s. Th erefore, the velocity of the sun is at least 215 km/s.
Th is is obviously a valid argument, despite the fact that neither premise nor conclusion is capable of simple truth. And it's not hard to say why. Its validity consists in the manifest fact that for any possible world w and frame of reference f, if the premise is true at w relative to f then so is the conclusion. More generally we can say that an argument Γ ├ S involving incomplete statements is valid when for any world w and any collection P of relevant parameters, if the elements of Γ are true in w relative to P, then so is S.
Boghossian's important point (largely implicit in Fear of Knowledge but explicit elsewhere 5 ) is that while this strategy is certainly available in many cases, it provides no cover for the epistemic relativist in the present context. Th e relativist invokes "entailment" in order to meet a specifi c challenge: to explain what it is for an epistemic sentence S to be true relative to an epistemic system C. But when we unpack this explanation in accordance with the conception of entailment sketched above, we fi nd ourselves chasing our own tails:
Question: What does it mean to say that S is true relative to C? Answer: It means that C, together with non-epistemic background facts, entails S. Question: What does it mean to say that C (plus background) entails S? Answer: It means that for any world w and epistemic system C*, if C (plus background) is true at w relative to C*, then S is true at w relative to C*.
Th e trouble is that the relativist has explained his key notion -truth relative to C -in terms of a notion of entailment, which has in turn been explained in terms of that very notion. If you don't already know what it is for an epistemic claim to be true relative to a system, the explanation will not help, which is just to say that it is useless for its intended purpose.
Th is shows, again decisively, that if the relativist is going to appeal to the notion of "entailment" in the explanation of his crucial notion, he must articulate a conception of entailment that is applicable to incomplete propositions and which is not explained in terms of ordinary entailment among their completions.
But isn't this straightforward? Consider the example once again:
Th e velocity of the sun is 220 km/s. So, the velocity of the sun is at least 215 km/s.
If we treat the mathematical vocabulary as part of the logical background for present purposes, then the surface logical form of this argument might be given as follows:
Th is is a schematic argument: f and a are dummy letters. Moreover it is a valid schematic argument in a perfectly familiar sense: Any interpretation that verifi es the premisethat is, any assignment of a unary function to f and an individual to a -also verifi es the conclusion. And so one might say in general that an argument involving "incomplete propositions" is valid iff the corresponding schematic argument is valid. Th e epistemic relativist may then solve the entailment problem as follows. Say that an epistemic statement S of the form 'E justifi es H' is true relative to C iff C, together with the non-epistemic background facts entails S. Th en explain entailment as above. Given any argument of the form
there is a corresponding schematic argument in which the epistemic words ('justifi es' , in our example) have been replaced by dummy letters. An epistemic argument (whose premises and conclusion include incomplete, non-truth-evaluable claims) is valid when the corresponding schematic argument is formally valid in the familiar sense. S is true relative to C when there is a valid argument of just this form.
It is worth stressing that the relativist need not claim that this conception of entailment corresponds to any ordinary notion, nor even that it constitutes a bona fi de notion of logical entailment. Th e relativist has been charged with the task of explaining a semi-technical notion: truth relative to an epistemic system. For that purpose, any well-defi ned notion will do, provided it is clear. If one balks at calling this relation "entailment, " so be it. Th e label does no work in the relativist's explanation of his view.
Th is approach will only work if the epistemic systems and the relation between such systems and the statements they support is particularly simple. A more realistic version of epistemic relativism might maintain, for example, that this relation is more like the relation between the US Constitution and the various legal verdicts it supports than it is like the relation between axioms and theorems in a formal theory; and in that case, the idea that this relation might be formally specifi able will seem implausible. But Boghossian does not object to epistemic relativism on these grounds. His objection is meant to apply to any version of the view. So I conclude that this part of Boghossian's case against the relativist is not conclusive.
iv
Let us now return to the fi rst challenge. If an epistemic system is not the sort of thing that can be true, what can it mean to say that a person accepts a given system? We cannot say that to accept C is to believe that C is true, since no one can (refl ectively and rationally) believe true what he takes to be incapable of truth. Nor can we say that to accept a system is to believe that it is true in relation to some contextually specifi ed epistemic system. For on the present view, the epistemic system specifi ed by the context is supposed to be, precisely, the epistemic system that the speaker accepts.
6 Th e conclusion is therefore inescapable: the relativist cannot identify the acceptance of a system with belief in that system. Indeed, it is hard to see how he can identify it with belief of any sort.
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If this is right, then the relativist has no choice but to regard acceptance of an epistemic system as a non-cognitive attitude of some sort. Th is is not to say that the epistemic relativist is committed to non-cognitivism about epistemic justifi cation. Th e relativist is not committed to the view that epistemic claims -situated assertions -are incapable of truth or falsity. Like claims about motion and rest, claims about justifi cation will in general be assessable as true or false, and they will be true when they are true relative to some contextually specifi ed epistemic system. It's just that when he comes to the point of saying how the context manages to specify an epistemic system, the relativist must invoke a notion of acceptance that cannot be identifi ed with belief.
What might acceptance be, if not belief ? Boghossian only considers one possibility. He imagines that the relativist might identify the acceptance of a system with the endorsement of certain imperatives associated with that system. If the system consists in statements of the form E justifi es B then the associated imperatives might be those of the form If E, believe B! Alternatively, if the epistemic system is a general biconditional of the form For all e, h: e justifi es h iff φ(e, h) then the associated imperatives might be those of the form Believe H if (and only if ) for some e, φ(e,H).
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To accept an epistemic system on this view is to commit oneself to these associated imperatives for revising one's opinion in response to evidence. Of course the relativist will then have to say something about what it is for a person to commit himself to an imperative. But presumably that is everyone's problem. Suppose Don Quixote has resolved to live his life in accordance with the chivalric code. Suppose further that he is lucid enough to realize that this commitment is strictly optional. When he accepts the imperative, "Never refuse a challenge from an equal, " this is not tantamount to the belief that he is morally (or otherwise) obliged to accept such challenges. In adopting the code he has endorsed a system of rules for living. But this resolution is not backed by a normative believe that such compliance is objectively required. What is it for Quixote to adopt a system of imperatives in this sense? It is hard to say. But since it is obviously possible for a person to adopt an idiosyncratic code of conduct in this sense, there must be some account of what this involves. And since the adoption of a code is not a matter of belief -What belief could it be? -there must be some suitably non-cognitivist account of commitment to an imperative.
Note fi rst that while it may be true that many claims of epistemic justifi cation are merely permissive, any adequate vocabulary for this part of epistemology will need an idiom of requirement as well. Sometimes the evidence, together with background knowledge, simply requires a certain belief. Th e imperatival strategy is well suited to capturing this aspect of our epistemic system. Second, and more importantly, there is a natural interpretation of the strategy that will cover the permissive norms as well. Suppose the chivalric code contains the rule:
If you have bested your enemy, dispatch him quickly or spare his life, but do not torment him.
Th is is a permissive rule, naturally expressed in English by a complex imperative: If C, then do X or Y, but not Z.
10 If Boghossian is right that epistemic codes are largely permissive, then the relativist may avail himself of this form. Th e imperative associated with a permissive reading of 'E justifi es H iff φ(e, h)' might be:
If φ(e, h) then either believe h (on the basis of e) or suspend judgment; but do not believe not-h (on the basis of e).
If this is not exactly right, no matter. Any theorist who employs the idiom of epistemic justifi cation must have some account of what a general epistemic norm of this sort requires and what it permits. Given any specifi cation of this sort, the imperativalist can construct a complex imperative to match.
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Boghossian's second objection is much more serious:
We would need some account of what makes any such system of imperatives epistemic imperatives, as opposed to (say) moral or pragmatic imperatives, so that they may be said to embody a conception of epistemic justifi cation as opposed to a conception of something else. But no such account has been provided and none seems to be forthcoming. (2006, 92) To illustrate the point, note that someone might endorse the imperative (B) If the Bible says that p, believe that p, not because he regards biblical testimony as a source of epistemic justifi cation, but rather because he thinks -epistemic reason be damned -that he is morally required to believe what the Bible says, no matter how bad the epistemic reasons in support of its claims may be.
11 Th e worry is that the present proposal will misdescribe such a person as having accepted an epistemic system according to which the biblical pronouncement that p justifi es the belief that p. Now there is a sense in which this too is (almost) everyone's problem. Anyone who thinks that there can be non-epistemic reasons for belief must distinguish epistemic justifi cation from other forms of justifi cation. But the problem is clearly more acute for the relativist who adopts the imperatival strategy than it is for the unreconstructed absolutist. Th e absolutist may say: "I believe in several distinct species of justifi cation that pertain to belief: epistemic, moral, prudential, all things considered, etc. Maybe each is primitive; maybe some or all admit of reductive analysis. But if there is a relation of epistemic justifi cation, there can be no objection to identifying 'acceptance of an epistemic system' with a belief about the conditions under which this relation is instantiated." As we have seen, the relativist cannot explain acceptance in this way. His plan is to identify "acceptance of an epistemic system" with a commitment to a system of imperatives. But here's the rub: the language of imperatives does not distinguish epistemic imperatives from imperatives of other kinds. It knows only a single, undiff erentiated idiom of requirement. So how is the relativist going to capture the notion of a distinctively epistemic imperative?
One strategy begins from the observation that while there is only one sort of imperative, there can be many diff erent reasons or grounds for accepting an imperative. If I accept an imperative because I believe that this will make me happier or more productive at work, then the imperative is in one sense pragmatic. If I accept it because I believe that doing so will make the world a better place, or because no other competing imperative can be willed as a universal law, then perhaps the imperative is a moral imperative. Th e idea then would be to identify certain distinctively epistemic grounds for accepting a system of rules for belief revision, and then to say that a person accepts such a system as an epistemic system when he endorses the imperatives that it contains on these grounds.
One natural way to develop this strategy is to suppose that we have certain distinctively epistemic goals, e.g., the goals of believing truth and avoiding error on matters in which we take an interest.
12 Th e person who embraces (B) on moral or religious grounds does not do so because thinks that he is more likely to advance these epistemic goals if he cleaves to it. He embraces the imperative because he thinks that even if the Bible is unreliable, he will be more virtuous if he believes what it says. And so the relativist might say this: an imperative governing the formation and revision of opinion is epistemic when it is endorsed for the purpose of advancing our epistemic goals, non-epistemic when endorsed for some other reason.
Th is is suggestive. It may well explain why certain derivative doxastic rules count as epistemic -e.g., my acceptance of the imperative, "Believe that p if the Encyclopaedia Britannica says that p." And yet it is obviously a fi ction to suppose that our fundamental epistemic commitments might be adopted on the ground that cleaving to them will lead to true beliefs -as if one might possess highly theoretical beliefs about the reliability of epistemic rules prior to endorsing one or another particular epistemic system.
Can the relativist salvage what is valuable in this proposal without indulging in this fi ction? Consider the contrast between Jerry, an old-fashioned fundamentalist who accepts biblical authority because he believes that the Bible is always right, and Tom, a more radical character, who accepts biblical authority because he believes that righteousness requires it, and that it's more important to be righteous than to be right. Th e diff erence between Tom and Jerry is not merely historical. It is not simply a matter of the goals they had in mind when they fi rst accepted the imperative. Th ere is a synchronic diff erence as well. At present, Jerry is not simply committed to the imperative (B): he is also committed to a factual proposition, viz., (BR) Normally, if the Bible says that p, then p.
More importantly, he is committed to revising his commitment to the imperative (B) should he come to doubt (BR). Th is is part of what it means to say that Jerry accepts the imperative on the ground that the Bible is a reliable source of information. Of course, Tom may also accept the infallibility of the Bible. (He will, if the Bible proclaims its own infallibility.) But his commitment to (B) is not grounded in this opinion. If he were to discover that the Bible is oft en wrong about matters of interest, this would have no direct bearing on his acceptance of the imperative. On the other hand, if he came to believe that righteousness does not require that he believe what the Bible says, then his grounds for accepting the imperative would be undercut.
So here is a rough proposal: X's commitment to an imperative of the form
is epistemic when it is grounded in a commitment to the truth of the conditional:
Th e imperative is non-epistemic for X when X's acceptance of it is not so grounded. How exactly should we understand the idiom of "grounding" that runs through this discussion? We have assumed that to accept an imperative is to commit oneself to complying with it. We have not analyzed this notion, but we have seen that it must make sense. So we would have a satisfactory account of the proposal if we could explain this talk of "grounding" in terms of this notion of commitment to compliance with an imperative. And here the most straightforward thought is this. Someone who accepts an ordinary fi rst-order imperative for revising his beliefs in response to evidence may also accept second-order imperatives for revising his fi rst order commitments. If you accept a fi rst-order imperative I, and at the same time accept a second order imperative I* of the form Accept I only if p, where p is an ordinary factual claim, then your commitment to I is grounded in a commitment to p in the sense that you are committed to rejecting I if you discover that p is false.
Our rough proposal may then be fl eshed out as follows. Every fi rst-order doxastic imperative of the form If φ(E, H) then believe H is associated with a reliability claim. Th is might be a simple conditional If φ(E, H) then H, or some hedged generic or probabilistic variant thereof. (It might also be a more elusive claim to the eff ect that acceptance of (I) is the best way to achieve the right balance between believing truth and avoiding error on matters of interest.) A doxastic imperative is epistemic for a given agent when it is grounded in its corresponding reliability claim for that agent, or in other words, when the agent is committed, by his acceptance of a higher-order imperative, to rejecting the doxastic imperative should he discover the corresponding reliability claim to be false.
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Of course this is still quite rough. Th e point here is not to provide a worked out version of the imperatival strategy. It is rather to suggest that for all we (or perhaps I should say I) now know, there is at least one way for the epistemic relativist to meet Boghossian's second challenge.
vii
Boghossian's third objection to the imperatival strategy is as follows.
It is not easy to see how to make sense of the relativization on the proposed view of epistemic systems. Th e idea, recall, is that we should no longer say 1. Copernicanism is justifi ed by Galileo's observations But only 2. According to the epistemic system that we accept, Science, Copernicanism is justifi ed by Galileo's observations. Where Science is now to be understood as consisting in a set of imperatives of the form
If E, then believe B!
But what exactly does (2) mean on an imperatival understanding of epistemic systems? What does it mean to say: According to the following system of imperatives, Copernicanism is justifi ed by Galileo's observations? Th e only sense we can make of this, I think, is to think of it as off ering an analysis of (1) in terms of claims of the form 3. According to the system of imperatives that we accept, if certain observations have been made, then believe Copernicanism.
… and the trouble is that a statement like (3) seems to be a purely factual remark about what imperatives we accept and a purely logical remark about what they require. And as we have already seen, it is impossible in this way to capture the normativity of an epistemic remark, a normativity that even the relativist would need to capture. (2006, Certain aspects of this objection do not apply to the version of relativism that we have been discussing. Th e proposal is to identify epistemic systems, not with systems of imperatives, but with incomplete propositions of a certain sort, and then to explain truth-relative-to-C in terms of formal (schematic) Claims about which imperatives a speaker accepts, and about what follows from these imperatives, are paradigmatically non-normative claims.
And if these claims are true, the relativist is in trouble.
To see that there may be a way forward, consider the remark:
Chivalry requires that I doff my helmet.
Th is might be a purely logico-descriptive remark about what a certain (possibly inane) system of imperatives requires. But in the mouth of someone who accepts those imperatives, the remark has an unmistakably normative fl avor. If Quixote is deliberating about what to do next, the discovery that chivalry requires him to doff his helmet may play the same role in his deliberation as a discovery about what morality requires plays in yours or mine. It is easy to construct a simple model that would explain this. Suppose there were a general background norm of the following sort:
(IR) If X accepts an imperative that requires that he do A, then X has a (presumptively conclusive) reason to do A.
14 It would then be unmysterious how the remark that chivalry requires him to doff his helmet might have genuine normative force for Quixote. Th e proposition expressed by means of the remark need not be normative per se. It might simply be the proposition:
If Quixote is to comply with the requirements of chivalry (which he accepts), then he must doff his helmet.
But given the background fact (which may or may not be "expressed" by the utterance) that Quixote accepts the imperatives of chivalry, it would follow from this proposition that Quixote has reason to doff his helmet. So even if the remark is not (as it were) intrinsically normative, it immediately conveys important normative information. So here is the beginning of one answer to Boghossian's third challenge. When Galileo says, 'E justifi es H' , the semantic content of his sentence is not a proposition at all: it is a proposition radical with a gap, which yields a sentence when that gap is fi lled by an epistemic system. (See note 2.) His situated utterance does however convey a number of complete propositions, one of which is the proposition that E justifi es H relative to the system that he (Galileo) accepts. Th is proposition may not be intrinsically normative.
15 But when such a proposition is true, this fact has normative force, since it entails, in conjunction with the background norm (IR), that there is a reason for Galileo to believe H. Th e remark is normative for Galileo in roughly the sense in which the remark that your prior plans require you to do something would be normative for you.
If this is on the right track, it would also explain how epistemic remarks can have interpersonal normative force. Suppose that you and I have both adopted the chivalric code, and that this is common knowledge between us. If I come to the view that chivalry requires a certain course of action in your situation, then my remark that chivalry requires A in such situations will have normative force for you, since it will entail, in conjunction with background facts, that you have reason to do A. Similarly, if some group shares an epistemic system and so endorses a single battery of normative imperatives, a discovery about what that system entails will have normative consequences for members of the group, even if the propositions at issue are merely logicodescriptive claims about which code they accept and what that code entails.
Th is is all suggestive, I suppose. But the account depends on (IR), and (IR) is anything but obvious. Bloggs may accept a morally obnoxious imperative -"Let me purge the countryside of foreigners" -but it would not follow from this that he has a reason for ethnic cleansing. Or consider the following case, adapted from John Broome (2001) . You are trying to decide whether to vacation in Paris or London. Th e case is quite close, but in fact the balance of reasons favors Paris. As you think through the problem, however, you make a mistake about this and decide to go to London. If the acceptance of the imperative, "Let me go to London!" generates a reason for you to go to London, then it may follow that your mistaken decision is no longer mistaken: having made it, you now have most reason to go to London. But that is hard to believe. If the case for Paris was stronger before your decision and you have not invested anything in the alternative plan, then it is still stronger. You don't now all of a sudden have suffi cient reason to go to London; if anything, you have suffi cient reason to revise your intention.
Th ese examples are not conclusive against (IR). In response to the fi rst, the proponent of (IR) will point out that the reasons generated by Bloggs's obnoxious commitment may be quite weak and so easily swamped by the powerful moral reasons against ethnic cleansing. In response to Broome's case, where even a weak reason might tip the balance, the proponent of (IR) may insist that the allegedly absurd verdict is not so absurd. Having committed oneself to a trip to London, one may now have suffi cient reason to go there. (Of course one may also have suffi cient reason to reconsider one's commitments and so to restore the status quo ante.) Alternatively, one might restrict the scope of (IR). One might say that a commitment provides a reason for compliance only when that commitment is not predicated on a false belief -a false factual belief, or a false belief about the relative strengths of one's commitment-independent reasons. Th is would presumably block both of the counterexamples we have considered.
Th ese two strategies should be congenial to the epistemic relativist who is trying to meet Boghossian's argument from normativity. If epistemic commitments always generate reasons for compliance, then individual epistemic remarks will entail claims about the speaker and those who share his commitments have reason to believe. If epistemic commitments generate reasons for compliance provided they are not predicated on false assumptions, then again, epistemic remarks will oft en possess genuine normative force.
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Apart from counterexamples of the sort adduced above, the main objection to (IR) is metaphoric: It strikes some philosophers as magical or mysterious that reasons can be conjured from thin air by free acts of decision or commitment. I place no weight on these considerations, and so at this point I see no decisive reason to reject the principle.
But this is not to say that there are good reasons for accepting it. Philosophers who reject the bootstrapping principle, as it is sometimes called, will appeal to other principles to explain the clear phenomena in the area. John Broome argues, for example, that while there is in general no reason to comply with one's commitments (or intentions), there is a normative requirement to see to it that if one intends to do A, then one does A. Since this is a "wide-scope" requirement, one may comply with it either by doing A or by revising one's commitment to doing A. Th e idea that intentions provide reasons for compliance is thus a mistaken interpretation of the fact that intentions entail wide-scope requirements of this sort.
Suppose Broome is right. Th en the only normative truth in the vicinity is this:
(IR*) One is required to see to it that (if one is committed to doing A, then one does A).
When Galileo says, 'E justifi es H' , he expresses the proposition that his epistemic commitments require a belief in H. Given (IR*) it will then be an immediate consequence that Galileo is required to see to it that either he revises his fundamental epistemic commitments or comes to believe H. Now this is already a normative claim of sorts, and so even on this approach we have begun to address Boghossian's third objection. Again, the proposition expressed by the epistemic utterance is not intrinsically normative; but together with background facts and norms it entails a claim about what the speaker is normatively constrained to do. Of course we do not normally hear epistemic claims as articulating a disjunctive requirement of this sort. We hear them as affi rming a positive "categorical" reason to believe H. But there are many possible explanations for this. One begins from the fact that in all normal cases it is not an option for the agent to reconfi gure his fundamental epistemic commitments. Th ey are buried too deep. He has no relevant access to them, much less control over them, etc. When one is under a normative requirement to do A or B and A is beyond one's control, one is under a de facto requirement to do B. Th is might go some way to explaining why a claim to the eff ect that E justifi es H does not strike us as articulating a disjunctive requirement: since one disjunct is simply not an option for us in most cases, we hear the claim as articulating a categorical requirement to believe H.
Th is explanation might be supplemented with another. Epistemic relativism (as it is now shaping up) is the view that epistemic reasons are for the most part commitment dependent. It is only because we have accepted certain imperatives that the evidence points in one direction rather than another for us. Th is may be true, but it is hardly obvious -it may be much more natural or commonsensical to regard epistemic reasons as commitment-independent. If that is so, then it is not surprising that we do not hear epistemic claims as imposing a disjunctive requirement either to accept H or to revise one's fundamental commitments. It takes esoteric philosophy to show that disjunctive requirements of this sort are the only bona fi de requirements in the picture.
Th is gives the relativist something to say in response to Boghossian's third challenge. But he may well want something more -perhaps something diff erent to say. So let me close with another suggestion. So far we have been trying to meet the normativity requirement by identifying commitment-dependent reasons or requirements that derive from the agent's ur-commitment to a system of epistemic imperatives. Th e reasons we have identifi ed are all in one sense practical, since they are grounded in intention-like states. Moreover the general principles that generate them are (for all we've said) absolute, non-relative norms governing compliance with such commitments. Th e epistemic relativist is not barred from appealing to such principles: the epistemic relativist need not be a relativist in other areas. But it might be said that this is not in the spirit of the view.
Here, then, is another thought. Th e challenge was to show how claims of the form 'E justifi es H' could be normative on the relativist's view given that the propositions they "express" are merely logico-descriptive propositions about which epistemic system the speaker accepts and what follows from that system. We haven't yet said what it is for a claim to be normative. But we have been operating with a rough criterion according to which S is normative if S immediately entails a claim about what someone has reason to do, or is required to do. But now notice this. Th e relativist has given us an account of how contextually situated remarks of the form 'E justifi es H' can be true. And surely it is analytic if anything is that if E justifi es H then E constitutes an epistemic reason to believe that H. So why aren't claims of the form 'E justifi es H' automatically normative, just by virtue of the fact that they entail claims about epistemic reasons?
Of course the relativist will add that claims about epistemic reasons are only true or false relative to one or another epistemic system. We haven't discussed examples of this form. But presumably any fully worked-out epistemic system will include claims about the conditions under which a given fact constitutes a reason to believe that P. Individual claims of the form 'E is a reason to believe that P' will be true if and only if the contextually specifi ed system entails them in the sense defi ned above. But contextually situated claims of this sort can still be true, and claims about epistemic justifi cation can entail them. So why isn't this enough to vindicate the normativity of epistemic judgment? I imagine that Boghossian will respond as follows. Look again at the propositions expressed by situated utterances about epistemic reasons. Th ey are all of the form E is reason to believe H relative to C.
And it is perfectly obvious that such propositions are not normative, even if they do contain the notion of a reason as an ingredient. Th ey are no more normative than propositions of the form According to Genghis Khan, R is a reason to φ.
One way to bring this out is to stress that a thinker who utterly repudiates C may still readily acknowledge that E is a reason to believe that H relative to C. In acknowledging this he will not be thinking a normative thought, or acknowledging a normative fact.
To reply in this way is to reject the criterion or normativity identifi ed above. It is to insist that some claims of the form 'A is a reason to …' are not normative claims, and hence that claims that imply such claims are not automatically normative. But if we reject this criterion it becomes quite unclear what it means for a claim to be normative. And this means that it is quite unclear what it would take to meet Boghossian's third challenge.
I do not pretend to know quite how to continue this discussion. But let me close with one possibility for the relativist. Begin by distinguishing two "propositions" that might be expressed by Galileo's utterance of 'E justifi es H' . Th e utterance might be said to express the proposition E justifi es H relative to C where C is a name for the epistemic system that Galileo accepts. But it might also be said to express the proposition E justifi es H relative to the system that I (or we) accept.
A proposition of this latter sort is essentially fi rst-personal. It is not a proposition at all in one familiar sense of the word; it is rather something more akin to a Fregean thought.
Th e relativist may concede that propositions of the fi rst sort are not normative in any interesting sense. But he might insist that things are otherwise with their essentially fi rst-personal counterparts. While it is true that a disinterested third party might accept that E justifi es H relative to C while repudiating C and so attaching no normative signifi cance to his judgment, anyone who acknowledges a fi rst-personal truth of the form 'E justifi es H relative to the system I accept' will fi nd the normative "force" of his thought (whatever that means) inescapable.
So here is another response to Boghossian's argument from normativity. A sincere situated utterance of the form 'E justifi es H' will normally express, among other thoughts, a thought of the form, E justifi es H relative to the system that I accept. Th is will entail, analytically, a corresponding thought of the form, E constitutes a reason to believe that H relative to the system that I accept. But this is a normative thought par excellence -or at least, it is one plausible example of a normative thought. So any judgment that immediately entails it is also normative. Epistemic remarks are normative on the relativist's view aft er all. Th ey may not entail absolute truths about what we have reason to believe. But that is not surprising. If epistemic reasons are all relative, as the relativist presumably thinks they are, then there are no such truths in the vicinity. If our criterion of normativity is not to preclude relativism about normative discourse in advance, then we cannot insist that any genuinely normative class of thoughts imply absolute claims about reasons for thought and action.
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